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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 000945

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [MASS](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [BY](#) [MZ](#) [ACOTA](#)

SUBJECT: HELPING MOZAMBIQUE BECOME AN EFFECTIVE
PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTOR

Classified by Amb Helen LaLime; Reasons: 1.4 (b and d)

1. (U) This is an action request -- see paragraph 8.

2. (C) Summary: Mozambique continues to seek a more active role in peacekeeping, especially in Africa. Despite very limited resources, the Mozambican Armed Forces have worked effectively at reinforced company strength in the Africa Union's PKO in Burundi. As that mission comes under U.N. control, Mozambique has been asked to increase its presence to battalion strength. The U.S. and Mozambique are closely engaged in meeting Mozambique's long-term training requirements for peacekeeping through the ACOTA program. Mozambique, however, also needs short-term equipment support to equip itself for the Burundi operation. Having proven itself effective at conflict prevention and resolution in the diplomatic realm, Mozambique should be considered for assistance to also give it military peacekeeping capabilities. End Summary

3. (C) Mozambique seeks to become a peacekeeping nation: Under the direction of President Chissano, Mozambique is seeking to increase its capabilities to serve in peacekeeping operations. Mozambican political leaders have described this policy as a logical extension of Mozambique's increasingly effective diplomatic engagement in conflict prevention and resolution. During his presidency of the Africa Union, President Chissano engaged effectively in the Great Lakes, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sao Tome. Mozambicans are proud to cite their own history of effective conflict resolution, including the UN PKO in Mozambique, as a model they can share with other countries struggling to come out of conflict.

4. (C) Initial PKO Steps: The Mozambicans have frequently engaged in peacekeeping but at a modest level. Small contingents were deployed to East Timor, the DRC and the Comoros. The Mozambicans this month deployed five military to Darfur to help plan for AU deployment needs (Mozambique does not presently plan to send a contingent to any long-term Sudan PKO). In 2003, Mozambique undertook its most ambitious PKO initiative by deploying a 220-person reinforced company to participate with South African and Ethiopian units in the AU's Burundi PKO. Meeting the equipment and funding requirements for that PKO was a daunting task. The British provided over \$5 million in equipment and budget support to make it happen. Prior to their deployment, observers in the field were frankly skeptical that the Mozambicans would provide any value-added to the mission given their poor resources and lack of experience. Half a year into their deployment, we are told the Mozambicans have greatly exceeded expectations and are performing creditably their assigned tasks.

5. (C) Gearing Up for More: Following the decision that the U.N. would assume the peacekeeping mission in Burundi, the Mozambicans were asked to not only maintain their presence in Burundi but to increase their deployment to an 850-man battalion level. President Chissano took the political decision to comply with the request leaving the military struggling to meet the standard equipment requirements the U.N. has set for the battalion. The Mozambicans are in close negotiations with the U.N. to determine what type of equipment and funding support will be available. At the same time, they have approached donors to seek equipment support. Among the standard items the U.N. has specified for any battalion participating in a PKO, the Mozambicans have highlights as critical gaps the following:

- 50 KVA Generators (2)
- 30 KVA Generators (7)
- APC (1)
- Armored Command Vehicle (1)
- Armored First Aid Vehicle (1)
- Armored Ambulance (1)
- Ambulances (4)
- Jeep-type 4x4s (15)
- Radio Jeeps (10)
- 2.5-5tn Transports (16)
- First-aid truck (1)
- Maintenance Truck (2)
- Water Trucks (3)
- Fuel Trucks (2)
- Refrigerator Truck (1)
- Bucket Loader (1)
- Forklifts (2)
- Cargo trailers (20)

-- Water Trailers (12)
-- Fuel Trailers (12)
-- 100 Watt Radio (3)
-- 20 Watt Radio (21)
-- 5 Watt Radio (45)

The Mozambicans also shares a preliminary budget of support costs for the first 60 days of the Mission of \$1.9 million.

16. (C) Where the U.S. is helping: The USG was unable to provide direct support to Mozambique for its 2003 deployment to Burundi. What limited assistance was available was instead directed to the Ethiopian contingent. Since that time, the USG has engaged the Mozambicans on the ACOTA program with the expectation that we will be able to help the Mozambicans develop the training capacity over several years to prepare troops for peacekeeping operations. Negotiations to date have been positive and ACOTA has proposed holding a strategic meeting in September with some 30 Mozambican military, political and diplomatic experts to clarify their long-term training needs. It is hoped that training of Battalion Officers and military trainers can start in January 2005 if not earlier. The ACOTA team is looking initially to train up four companies to meet Mozambique's stated desire to have at least one trained battalion ready for peacekeeping operations. In addition to the training, the ACOTA program will provide some unit equipment including field hospital, communications and water treatment material. ACOTA specifically will not provide vehicles or lethal equipment. While the Mozambicans welcome this contribution to the long-term capabilities of their military, they are aware this training will have little or no impact on their current operational requirements.

17. (C) Where the U.S. can help more: We are aware the USG will not be in a position to meet the extensive list of equipment requested in paragraph 4. If the U.N. really want Mozambique to expand its presence in Burundi they will have to work with them to meet their equipment needs or scale back the equipment list by reducing the complexity of the mission order or pairing Mozambique with a better equipped partner. That said, we believe it is in U.S. security interests to support Mozambique's efforts to contribute immediately in Burundi and, over the longer term, in the region. The Mozambicans would be extremely appreciative of any tangible support that can be given to their immediate operational needs.

18. (C) Action Request: Embassy requests that the Department, in conjunction with DoD, identify items that could be provided to meet some of the Mozambican equipment requirements for the Burundi Mission. If EDA proves the best avenue to meet some of these needs, we would welcome a DoD team to come discuss the program with the Mozambicans and to work out FMF financing to cover any make-ready or shipping costs. We underline that while we have been applauding Mozambique's increasingly active and effective peacekeeping initiatives over the past several years -- we have yet to provide any tangible support for these efforts. It's time to do something.

19. (U) Minimize considered.
LA LIME